I'm interested in the mind and its place in the natural world. Understanding the mind does not only involve considering the human mind: animals have minds too, and so might machines. Any account of mental phenomena must be sensitive to the many kinds of minds there are.
My current research project focusses on episodic memory - that is, memory for personally experienced past events, which we can now 'mentally relive' or 'replay in the mind's eye'. I am interested in the nature of this type of memory, and in the role it plays in our mental lives. I am also exploring whether this form of memory is uniquely human. Do any non-human animals have episodic memory - and how could we know if they did? And what would it take to realise episodic memory in artificial agents? What is the ethical significance of an answer to these questions?
As well as episodic memory, I have written on self-recognition, self-awareness and mindreading in nonhuman animals. I also have research interests in the metaphysics of biology. In this area, I've written on how to count organisms in conjoined twinning.
My current research project focusses on episodic memory - that is, memory for personally experienced past events, which we can now 'mentally relive' or 'replay in the mind's eye'. I am interested in the nature of this type of memory, and in the role it plays in our mental lives. I am also exploring whether this form of memory is uniquely human. Do any non-human animals have episodic memory - and how could we know if they did? And what would it take to realise episodic memory in artificial agents? What is the ethical significance of an answer to these questions?
As well as episodic memory, I have written on self-recognition, self-awareness and mindreading in nonhuman animals. I also have research interests in the metaphysics of biology. In this area, I've written on how to count organisms in conjoined twinning.
Publications
Articles
Conjoined Twinning & Biological Individuation. Forthcoming. Philosophical Studies.
Abstract: In dicephalus conjoined twinning, it appears that two heads share a body; in cephalopagus, it appears two bodies share a head. How many human animals are present in these cases? One answer is that there are two in both cases: conjoined twins are precisely that, conjoined twins. Another is that the number of human animals is the same as the apparent number of bodies - so, there is one in dicephalus and two in cephalopagus. I show that both answers are incorrect: on prominent accounts of biological individuation, there is a single human animal in both cases. This has a number of consequences for the debate about what we are.
The Impure Phenomenology of Episodic Memory. Forthcoming. Mind and Language.
Abstract: Episodic memory has a distinctive phenomenology: it involves 'mentally reliving' a past event. It's been suggested that if episodic memory is characterised in terms of this phenomenology, it will be 'impossible to test' for it in animals - because this is to characterise it in terms of its 'purely phenomenal features', which cannot be detected in nonverbal behaviour. I argue that this is a mistake. The phenomenological features of episodic memory are impure phenomenological features, which can be detected in animal behaviour. So, insisting on a phenomenological characterisation of episodic memory does nothing to damage the prospects for detecting it in nonhuman animals.
Mapping the Minds of Others. 2019. Review of Philosophy & Psychology 10 (4), 747-767.
Abstract: Some mindreaders can ascribe representational states to others. I argue that these mindreaders might differ from one another with respect to the format they take representational states to have. Some might take mental states to be linguistic, whilst others might take them to be map-like or to have another format. Since formats differ in their expressive power and formal features, these differences make a significant difference to the range of mental state attributions a mindreader can make. I close by articulating the significance of this for the study of mindreading in the great apes.
Learning from the Past: Epistemic Generativity and the Function of Episodic Memory. 2019. Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (5-6), 242-251. Winner of the 2018 Annual Essay Prize of the Centre for Philosophical Psychology, University of Antwerp.
Abstract: I argue that the function of episodic memory is to store information about the past, against the currently orthodox view that it is to support imagining the future. I show that episodic memory is epistemically generative, allowing organisms to learn from past events retroactively. This confers adaptive benefits in three domains: reasoning about the world, skill and social interaction. Given the role played by evolutionary perspectives in comparative research, this argument necessitates a radical shift in the study of episodic memory in nonhumans.
Mirror Self-Recognition & Self-Identification. 2018. Philosophy & Phenomenological Research 97 (2), 284-303.
Abstract: Some animals, including the great apes, are capable of mirror self-recognition. This is widely taken to show that they are self-aware - but there is some disagreement about whether the self-awareness in question is psychological or bodily self-awareness. I argue that self-recognition does not involve psychological self-awareness, but involves more than bodily self-awareness: it also involves 'objective self-awareness', the capacity for first-person thoughts which rest on identification, and are thus vulnerable to error through misidentification.
Other Pieces
Reading Minds & Reading Maps. 2019. At the iCog Blog.
Can Cats Read Minds? 2018. At the Institute of Art & Ideas.
How Smart is Your Pet? 2017. At the Institute of Art & Ideas.
Articles
Conjoined Twinning & Biological Individuation. Forthcoming. Philosophical Studies.
Abstract: In dicephalus conjoined twinning, it appears that two heads share a body; in cephalopagus, it appears two bodies share a head. How many human animals are present in these cases? One answer is that there are two in both cases: conjoined twins are precisely that, conjoined twins. Another is that the number of human animals is the same as the apparent number of bodies - so, there is one in dicephalus and two in cephalopagus. I show that both answers are incorrect: on prominent accounts of biological individuation, there is a single human animal in both cases. This has a number of consequences for the debate about what we are.
The Impure Phenomenology of Episodic Memory. Forthcoming. Mind and Language.
Abstract: Episodic memory has a distinctive phenomenology: it involves 'mentally reliving' a past event. It's been suggested that if episodic memory is characterised in terms of this phenomenology, it will be 'impossible to test' for it in animals - because this is to characterise it in terms of its 'purely phenomenal features', which cannot be detected in nonverbal behaviour. I argue that this is a mistake. The phenomenological features of episodic memory are impure phenomenological features, which can be detected in animal behaviour. So, insisting on a phenomenological characterisation of episodic memory does nothing to damage the prospects for detecting it in nonhuman animals.
Mapping the Minds of Others. 2019. Review of Philosophy & Psychology 10 (4), 747-767.
Abstract: Some mindreaders can ascribe representational states to others. I argue that these mindreaders might differ from one another with respect to the format they take representational states to have. Some might take mental states to be linguistic, whilst others might take them to be map-like or to have another format. Since formats differ in their expressive power and formal features, these differences make a significant difference to the range of mental state attributions a mindreader can make. I close by articulating the significance of this for the study of mindreading in the great apes.
Learning from the Past: Epistemic Generativity and the Function of Episodic Memory. 2019. Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (5-6), 242-251. Winner of the 2018 Annual Essay Prize of the Centre for Philosophical Psychology, University of Antwerp.
Abstract: I argue that the function of episodic memory is to store information about the past, against the currently orthodox view that it is to support imagining the future. I show that episodic memory is epistemically generative, allowing organisms to learn from past events retroactively. This confers adaptive benefits in three domains: reasoning about the world, skill and social interaction. Given the role played by evolutionary perspectives in comparative research, this argument necessitates a radical shift in the study of episodic memory in nonhumans.
Mirror Self-Recognition & Self-Identification. 2018. Philosophy & Phenomenological Research 97 (2), 284-303.
Abstract: Some animals, including the great apes, are capable of mirror self-recognition. This is widely taken to show that they are self-aware - but there is some disagreement about whether the self-awareness in question is psychological or bodily self-awareness. I argue that self-recognition does not involve psychological self-awareness, but involves more than bodily self-awareness: it also involves 'objective self-awareness', the capacity for first-person thoughts which rest on identification, and are thus vulnerable to error through misidentification.
Other Pieces
Reading Minds & Reading Maps. 2019. At the iCog Blog.
Can Cats Read Minds? 2018. At the Institute of Art & Ideas.
How Smart is Your Pet? 2017. At the Institute of Art & Ideas.
Papers In Progress/Under Review
Episodic Memory & the Method of Loci
Discussions of episodic memory's evolutionary function frequently suggest that its function is not mnemonic, but that it exists in virtue of its relationship to future directed imagination. Against that, this paper argues that episodic memory has a mnemonic function: that it exists in virtue of its role in the storage and retrieval of information. More specifically, it argues that episodic memories facilitate the encoding and retrieval of semantic memories, in a manner similar to the 'mind palaces' used in the method of loci.
Discovering the Past
The 'dependency thesis' claims that episodic memory is necessary, either developmentally or constitutively, for possessing temporal concepts like the concept of the past. This paper takes a sceptical look at that claim, and explores what roles episodic memory might play in our grasp of temporal concepts.
Do Animals Have Episodic Memory?
Despite many apparently confirmatory results, there is little consensus about whether nonhuman animals have episodic memory. Why is that? I focus on a family of sceptical views I call ‘kind scepticism’. Kind sceptics argue that the evidence doesn’t support the hypothesis that animals have episodic memory, since it fails to rule out that they have a form of memory that, though similar to episodic memory, differs in kind. This raises a difficult question about how to delineate episodic memory as a psychological kind. I suggest that kind sceptics and advocates of nonhuman episodic memory are committed to different answers to this question, and that their disagreement can’t be settled by appealing to the objective structure of the world, but only by appeal to pragmatic considerations.
Maximality Principles & Mammalian Pregnancy
This paper asks whether organisms can be parts of other organisms, focussing on the case of mammalian pregnancy. As Elselijn Kingma (2019) has recently argued, a foetus is a part of the gestating organism. But given certain theories about the nature of organisms, this raises questions about whether the foetus can be an organism in its own right - and correspondingly, if we are organisms, about when we come to be.
Two More Logical Problems for Animal Mindreading
The animal mindreading research programme faces a 'logical problem', according to which the methods used to detect mindreading in animals cannot detect it, in principle. Existing solutions to this problem succeed relative to a permissive conception of mindreading. However, I argue that at least two more demanding conceptions of mindreading are prominent in the literature, and that these generate further logical problems which require us to empirically discriminate between different conceptions of mindreading.
Episodic Memory & the Method of Loci
Discussions of episodic memory's evolutionary function frequently suggest that its function is not mnemonic, but that it exists in virtue of its relationship to future directed imagination. Against that, this paper argues that episodic memory has a mnemonic function: that it exists in virtue of its role in the storage and retrieval of information. More specifically, it argues that episodic memories facilitate the encoding and retrieval of semantic memories, in a manner similar to the 'mind palaces' used in the method of loci.
Discovering the Past
The 'dependency thesis' claims that episodic memory is necessary, either developmentally or constitutively, for possessing temporal concepts like the concept of the past. This paper takes a sceptical look at that claim, and explores what roles episodic memory might play in our grasp of temporal concepts.
Do Animals Have Episodic Memory?
Despite many apparently confirmatory results, there is little consensus about whether nonhuman animals have episodic memory. Why is that? I focus on a family of sceptical views I call ‘kind scepticism’. Kind sceptics argue that the evidence doesn’t support the hypothesis that animals have episodic memory, since it fails to rule out that they have a form of memory that, though similar to episodic memory, differs in kind. This raises a difficult question about how to delineate episodic memory as a psychological kind. I suggest that kind sceptics and advocates of nonhuman episodic memory are committed to different answers to this question, and that their disagreement can’t be settled by appealing to the objective structure of the world, but only by appeal to pragmatic considerations.
Maximality Principles & Mammalian Pregnancy
This paper asks whether organisms can be parts of other organisms, focussing on the case of mammalian pregnancy. As Elselijn Kingma (2019) has recently argued, a foetus is a part of the gestating organism. But given certain theories about the nature of organisms, this raises questions about whether the foetus can be an organism in its own right - and correspondingly, if we are organisms, about when we come to be.
Two More Logical Problems for Animal Mindreading
The animal mindreading research programme faces a 'logical problem', according to which the methods used to detect mindreading in animals cannot detect it, in principle. Existing solutions to this problem succeed relative to a permissive conception of mindreading. However, I argue that at least two more demanding conceptions of mindreading are prominent in the literature, and that these generate further logical problems which require us to empirically discriminate between different conceptions of mindreading.
Recent & Upcoming Talks
TBC
- Popper Seminar, LSE, 2020
Nonhuman Episodic Memory, Scepticism & Psychological Kinds
- HPS Departmental Seminar, University of Cambridge, 2020
Maximality Principles & Mammalian Pregnancy
- Better Understanding the Metaphysics of Pregnancy Workshop, University of Southampton, 2020
The Boundaries of Memory
- Boundaries of the Mind, CEU Vienna, 2019
- The Mental Sciences Club, University of Cambridge, 2019
Discovering the Past
- About Time: The De Nunc & The De Se, University of Leeds, 2019
- Origins of Temporal Concepts, Queen’s University Belfast, 2019
The Benefits of Hindsight
- Centre for Philosophical Psychology, University of Antwerp, 2019
- Issues in Philosophy of Memory 2, Université Grenoble Alpes, 2019
- Mind & Reason Seminar, York 2019
- European Society for Philosophy & Psychology, Athens, 2019
- CamPoS, University of Cambridge, 2018
The Impure Phenomenology of Episodic Memory
- Comparative Cognition Lab Group, University of Cambridge, 2018
- London Mind Group, KCL/UCL, 2018
- Stirling Visiting Speaker Seminar, University of Stirling, 2018
- L'animalité Workshop, Université de Nantes, 2018
Dicephalus Twinning & Biological Individuation
- Serious Metaphysics Group, University of Cambridge, 2018
- Joint Session, Oxford University, 2018
Two Logical Problems for Animal Mindreading
- Mind Network, University of Nottingham, 2017
- Joint Session, University of Edinburgh, 2017
Episodic Memory, Consciousness & Behaviour
- Issues in Philosophy of Memory, University of Cologne, 2017
- British Society for Philosophy of Science, University of Edinburgh, 2017
False Belief and Counterfactual Thinking
- New Directions in the Study of the Mind, University of Cambridge, 2017
Mapping the Minds of Others
- Joint Session, Cardiff University, 2016
- Persons as Animals Conference, Leeds University, 2016
- Moral Sciences Club, University of Cambridge, 2016
TBC
- Popper Seminar, LSE, 2020
Nonhuman Episodic Memory, Scepticism & Psychological Kinds
- HPS Departmental Seminar, University of Cambridge, 2020
Maximality Principles & Mammalian Pregnancy
- Better Understanding the Metaphysics of Pregnancy Workshop, University of Southampton, 2020
The Boundaries of Memory
- Boundaries of the Mind, CEU Vienna, 2019
- The Mental Sciences Club, University of Cambridge, 2019
Discovering the Past
- About Time: The De Nunc & The De Se, University of Leeds, 2019
- Origins of Temporal Concepts, Queen’s University Belfast, 2019
The Benefits of Hindsight
- Centre for Philosophical Psychology, University of Antwerp, 2019
- Issues in Philosophy of Memory 2, Université Grenoble Alpes, 2019
- Mind & Reason Seminar, York 2019
- European Society for Philosophy & Psychology, Athens, 2019
- CamPoS, University of Cambridge, 2018
The Impure Phenomenology of Episodic Memory
- Comparative Cognition Lab Group, University of Cambridge, 2018
- London Mind Group, KCL/UCL, 2018
- Stirling Visiting Speaker Seminar, University of Stirling, 2018
- L'animalité Workshop, Université de Nantes, 2018
Dicephalus Twinning & Biological Individuation
- Serious Metaphysics Group, University of Cambridge, 2018
- Joint Session, Oxford University, 2018
Two Logical Problems for Animal Mindreading
- Mind Network, University of Nottingham, 2017
- Joint Session, University of Edinburgh, 2017
Episodic Memory, Consciousness & Behaviour
- Issues in Philosophy of Memory, University of Cologne, 2017
- British Society for Philosophy of Science, University of Edinburgh, 2017
False Belief and Counterfactual Thinking
- New Directions in the Study of the Mind, University of Cambridge, 2017
Mapping the Minds of Others
- Joint Session, Cardiff University, 2016
- Persons as Animals Conference, Leeds University, 2016
- Moral Sciences Club, University of Cambridge, 2016