Overview
I'm primarily interested in questions about the minds of animals, and what we can learn about animals' minds from their behaviour. My current research centres around two questions. First, are animals mindreaders - do they know that the creatures around them have mental lives? Second, do animals have episodic memory - can they recall and mentally relive their past experiences? My research aims to clarify the nature of these mental capacities, whether they exist in 'minimal' forms, and how they manifest in behaviour. I've also written about mirror self-recognition in animals, and what it tells us about animals' self-awareness.
Alongside my interest in animal cognition, I have research interests in the philosophy of mind and psychology more broadly, as well as metaphysics and the philosophy of biology. Recently, I've been thinking about how we count organisms in cases of conjoined twinning - and why this matters for animalism, the view that we are animals.
I'm primarily interested in questions about the minds of animals, and what we can learn about animals' minds from their behaviour. My current research centres around two questions. First, are animals mindreaders - do they know that the creatures around them have mental lives? Second, do animals have episodic memory - can they recall and mentally relive their past experiences? My research aims to clarify the nature of these mental capacities, whether they exist in 'minimal' forms, and how they manifest in behaviour. I've also written about mirror self-recognition in animals, and what it tells us about animals' self-awareness.
Alongside my interest in animal cognition, I have research interests in the philosophy of mind and psychology more broadly, as well as metaphysics and the philosophy of biology. Recently, I've been thinking about how we count organisms in cases of conjoined twinning - and why this matters for animalism, the view that we are animals.
Publications
Articles
Mirror Self-Recognition & Self-Identification. 2017. Philosophy & Phenomenological Research 94 (3)
Abstract: Some animals, including the great apes, are capable of mirror self-recognition. This is widely taken to show that they are self-aware - but there is some disagreement about whether the self-awareness in question is psychological or bodily self-awareness. I argue that self-recognition does not involve psychological self-awareness, but involves more than bodily self-awareness: it also involves 'objective self-awareness', the capacity for first-person thoughts which rest on identification, and are thus vulnerable to error through misidentification.
Other Pieces
How Smart is Your Pet? 2017. On the Institute of Art & Ideas website.
Articles
Mirror Self-Recognition & Self-Identification. 2017. Philosophy & Phenomenological Research 94 (3)
Abstract: Some animals, including the great apes, are capable of mirror self-recognition. This is widely taken to show that they are self-aware - but there is some disagreement about whether the self-awareness in question is psychological or bodily self-awareness. I argue that self-recognition does not involve psychological self-awareness, but involves more than bodily self-awareness: it also involves 'objective self-awareness', the capacity for first-person thoughts which rest on identification, and are thus vulnerable to error through misidentification.
Other Pieces
How Smart is Your Pet? 2017. On the Institute of Art & Ideas website.
Papers In Progress/Under Review
Mapping the Minds of Others (under review)
Abstract: I propose that animals may be 'mindmappers' - that they ascribe mental states with a map-like format to others. This, I argue, would impose certain restrictions on their mindreading abilities: since maps are expressively limited, they would be able to ascribe only a restricted class of mental states. So, mindmapping is empirically detectable. If an investigation shows that animals are mindmappers, it reveals one way in which human and animal mindreading differ in kind. On the other hand, if it transpires that animals ascribe mental states with a sentential format, this constitutes evidence for a nonhuman language of thought.
Two More Logical Problems for Animal Mindreading (under review)
Abstract: The animal mindreading research programme faces a 'logical problem', according to which the methods used to detect mindreading in animals cannot detect it, in principle. Existing solutions to this problem succeed relative to a permissive conception of mindreading - but I show that at least two more demanding conceptions of mindreading are prominent in the literature. These generate two more logical problems, requiring us to discriminate between stronger and weaker conceptions of mindreading. Against some indications to the contrary, I argue that these are empirical problems, which can be solved. If we are interested in finding out what animals know about other minds, they are worth taking seriously.
Conjoined Twinning & Biological Individuation (under review)
Abstract: In dicephalus conjoined twinning, it appears that two heads share a body; in cephalopagus, it appears two bodies share a head. How many human animals are present in these cases? One answer is that there are two in both cases: conjoined twins are precisely that, conjoined twins. Another is that the number of human animals is the same as the apparent number of bodies - so, there is one in dicephalus and two in cephalopagus. I show that both answers are incorrect: on prominent accounts of biological individuation, there is a single human animal in both cases. This has a number of consequences for the debate about what we are.
The Impure Phenomenology of Episodic Memory (under review)
Abstract: Episodic memory has a distinctive phenomenology: it involves 'mentally reliving' a past event. It's been suggested that if episodic memory is characterised in terms of this phenomenology, it will be 'impossible to test' for it in animals - because this is to characterise it in terms of its 'purely phenomenological features', which cannot be detected in nonverbal behaviour. I argue that this is a mistake. The phenomenological features of episodic memory are impure phenomenological features, which can be detected in animal behaviour. So, insisting on a phenomenological characterisation of episodic memory does nothing to damage the prospects for detecting it in nonhuman animals.
False Belief & Counterfactual Thinking [email for draft]
Abstract: A distinction is sometimes drawn between 'relational' and 'representational' forms of mindreading - where relational mindreaders construe mental states as relations between agents and things in the world, and representational mindreaders construe mental states as representations of things in the world. This distinction is used to explain the difference between the false belief test and other mindreading tasks. I argue that this misfires: what makes the false belief test challenging is not that it requires representing representations, but that it requires representing the way things might have been.
Mapping the Minds of Others (under review)
Abstract: I propose that animals may be 'mindmappers' - that they ascribe mental states with a map-like format to others. This, I argue, would impose certain restrictions on their mindreading abilities: since maps are expressively limited, they would be able to ascribe only a restricted class of mental states. So, mindmapping is empirically detectable. If an investigation shows that animals are mindmappers, it reveals one way in which human and animal mindreading differ in kind. On the other hand, if it transpires that animals ascribe mental states with a sentential format, this constitutes evidence for a nonhuman language of thought.
Two More Logical Problems for Animal Mindreading (under review)
Abstract: The animal mindreading research programme faces a 'logical problem', according to which the methods used to detect mindreading in animals cannot detect it, in principle. Existing solutions to this problem succeed relative to a permissive conception of mindreading - but I show that at least two more demanding conceptions of mindreading are prominent in the literature. These generate two more logical problems, requiring us to discriminate between stronger and weaker conceptions of mindreading. Against some indications to the contrary, I argue that these are empirical problems, which can be solved. If we are interested in finding out what animals know about other minds, they are worth taking seriously.
Conjoined Twinning & Biological Individuation (under review)
Abstract: In dicephalus conjoined twinning, it appears that two heads share a body; in cephalopagus, it appears two bodies share a head. How many human animals are present in these cases? One answer is that there are two in both cases: conjoined twins are precisely that, conjoined twins. Another is that the number of human animals is the same as the apparent number of bodies - so, there is one in dicephalus and two in cephalopagus. I show that both answers are incorrect: on prominent accounts of biological individuation, there is a single human animal in both cases. This has a number of consequences for the debate about what we are.
The Impure Phenomenology of Episodic Memory (under review)
Abstract: Episodic memory has a distinctive phenomenology: it involves 'mentally reliving' a past event. It's been suggested that if episodic memory is characterised in terms of this phenomenology, it will be 'impossible to test' for it in animals - because this is to characterise it in terms of its 'purely phenomenological features', which cannot be detected in nonverbal behaviour. I argue that this is a mistake. The phenomenological features of episodic memory are impure phenomenological features, which can be detected in animal behaviour. So, insisting on a phenomenological characterisation of episodic memory does nothing to damage the prospects for detecting it in nonhuman animals.
False Belief & Counterfactual Thinking [email for draft]
Abstract: A distinction is sometimes drawn between 'relational' and 'representational' forms of mindreading - where relational mindreaders construe mental states as relations between agents and things in the world, and representational mindreaders construe mental states as representations of things in the world. This distinction is used to explain the difference between the false belief test and other mindreading tasks. I argue that this misfires: what makes the false belief test challenging is not that it requires representing representations, but that it requires representing the way things might have been.
Recent & Upcoming Talks
TBC
- CamPoS, University of Cambridge, 2018
- Workshop on Animal Cognition, Nantes, 2018
The Impure Phenomenology of Episodic Memory
- London Mind Group, KCL/UCL, 2018
- Stirling Visiting Speaker Seminar, University of Stirling, 2018
Animalism, Dicephalus Twinning & Biological Individuation
- Serious Metaphysics Group, University of Cambridge, 2018
- Joint Session, Oxford University, 2018
Two Logical Problems for Animal Mindreading
- Mind Network, University of Nottingham, 2017
- Joint Session, University of Edinburgh, 2017
Episodic Memory, Consciousness & Behaviour
- Issues in Philosophy of Memory, University of Cologne, 2017
- British Society for Philosophy of Science, University of Edinburgh, 2017
False Belief and Counterfactual Thinking
- New Directions in the Study of the Mind, University of Cambridge, 2017
Mapping the Minds of Others
- Joint Session, Cardiff University, 2016
- Persons as Animals Conference, Leeds University, 2016
- Moral Sciences Club, University of Cambridge, 2016
In Defence of Intentionalism About Moods
- Joint Session, University of Warwick, 2015
Moral Sense or Common Sense? The Evolution of Mindreading
- Empathy & Interpretation Across the Disciplines, University of Cambridge, 2015
TBC
- CamPoS, University of Cambridge, 2018
- Workshop on Animal Cognition, Nantes, 2018
The Impure Phenomenology of Episodic Memory
- London Mind Group, KCL/UCL, 2018
- Stirling Visiting Speaker Seminar, University of Stirling, 2018
Animalism, Dicephalus Twinning & Biological Individuation
- Serious Metaphysics Group, University of Cambridge, 2018
- Joint Session, Oxford University, 2018
Two Logical Problems for Animal Mindreading
- Mind Network, University of Nottingham, 2017
- Joint Session, University of Edinburgh, 2017
Episodic Memory, Consciousness & Behaviour
- Issues in Philosophy of Memory, University of Cologne, 2017
- British Society for Philosophy of Science, University of Edinburgh, 2017
False Belief and Counterfactual Thinking
- New Directions in the Study of the Mind, University of Cambridge, 2017
Mapping the Minds of Others
- Joint Session, Cardiff University, 2016
- Persons as Animals Conference, Leeds University, 2016
- Moral Sciences Club, University of Cambridge, 2016
In Defence of Intentionalism About Moods
- Joint Session, University of Warwick, 2015
Moral Sense or Common Sense? The Evolution of Mindreading
- Empathy & Interpretation Across the Disciplines, University of Cambridge, 2015